

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MIGRATION IN AFRICA CONFERENCE REPORT











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Introduction & Welcome

Conference Chair: Emeritus Prof. Simon Bekker, Sociology and Social Anthropology Department, University of Stellenbosch

Welcome

Prof Brian O'Connell, Rector and Vice Chancellor, University of the Western Cape

Migration is not always an easy thing. Part of the challenge is to embrace those who come as migrants. Cultures are often deeply challenged resulting in people migrating and moving. People make sense of their new environment and flourish and survive. However, things are never the same – they have access to other ways of thinking and knowing. Africa is the second-largest continent. It remains sparsely populated. Due to its isolation Africa was not part of some of humankind's great intellectual leaps (such as the Industrial Revolution) and therefore Africa was not impacted upon. The current Scientific Revolution gives us hope – offering Africa the opportunity to be part of the world in the knowledge project. We are in transition from one way of thinking to another – the question is how well we will do with these new challenges. Food and resources have become a problem as has water – there is not enough to sustain life in some areas. When resources are scarce people descend into barbarism. How will we behave? Humans are on a majestic quest. According to Barrett, there are seven levels of consciousness. Our overall goal as humans is to reach the stage of serving others and the planet.

Panel #1 Presentation of Africans on the Move report

Moderator - Dr Fabio Baggio, Scalabrini International Migration Institute (Italy)

Summary of presentations

Background to the book *Africans on the Move* -Dr Fabio Baggio, Scalabrini International Migration Institute (Italy)

The book is the output of research on human mobility in four countries. It is published by the Scalabrini Institute which was founded in 1887 and started its work in America. In the 1960s the human and social sciences research aspects were added and the institute started centres for migration studies in other parts of the world. There are now eight – including the one in Cape Town which was established in April 2014.

The main goal is to contribute to knowledge production on human mobility in Africa. Four countries were chosen in which to collect data and disseminate results. The work looks at trends and mapping of migration, assesses migration policies and drafts recommendations. Workshops are being held to disseminate the book and the research.

Ghana and Nigeria - Dr Edmond Akwasi Agyeman, University of Education, Winneba (Ghana)

Ghana

The research looked at human mobility dynamics, history and key trends.

During pre-independence there was large-scale immigration (including from India and Lebanon) as well as internal migration from north to south. This was mostly to feed the Colonial economy. In the post-independence period — Ghana became a migrant-sending country. From the 1990s there was an increased arrival of refugees and asylum seekers from neighbouring countries. In 2013 there were over 600 000 immigrants and in 2014 there were over 18 000 refugees. Most are labour migrants and self-employed, attracted by the economic boom and increased tourism. It is likely that Ebola has had a negative impact on this.

As far as emigrants are concerned there were over 250 000 in 2013. Most of them went to Europe. Many claim to seek asylum but that may just be for entrance purposes. Many find themselves as irregular immigrants and are deported back. The country gains a lot from migrants through remittances. Trafficking and smuggling are big problems – particularly of women and children who are sent for forced labour and sex trafficking.

Dual citizenship is allowed in Ghana and, as Ghana is part of the Economic community of West African States (ECOWAS), citizens can move freely in ECOWAS countries.

The shortfalls identified by the study include lack of co-ordination with too many responsible departments and institutes, and the gap between policy and implementation.

Research gaps include – ethical and humanitarian issues, the impact of migration on development, regional and Asian immigration, gender and family issues, and, a lack of understanding of the movement flows.

Nigeria

There were many difficulties in doing this research. It was not easy to gain access.

Pre-independence migration in Nigeria was influenced by the existence of different empires; for example, the Sokoto Caliphate, some of which used slave raids which directed the flow of people. The arrival of Europeans caused widespread migration to feed the colonial economy. The Civil War in the 1960s and 1970s destabilised the country and in the post-independence period many of the migration patterns have been maintained.

Oil made Nigeria a migrant-destination country but, due to mismanagement, there was large-scale repatriation of foreigners in the 1980s. This meant that training of locals was urgently needed and people moved to Europe for education. Nigerians now constitute the largest African migrant community in most other countries. Nigerian migrants are largely concentrated in English-speaking countries. Many seek refugee asylum protection. There is also extensive criminalisation of Nigerian emigration which is a serious human rights concern. Trafficking and smuggling is a major problem because the government does not comply with international regulations on trafficking. The government has ratified some international conventions but doesn't actually implement them. There are also high levels of internally displaced persons – currently due to the activities of Boko Haram.

Problems include the lack of coherence and co-ordination, a lack of leadership, political exclusion, the slow pace of policy enactment, and the criminalisation of immigration. The government also doesn't

want the diaspora to participate in local politics. There are few legal channels for migrants to move freely. Host countries are also often not welcoming. Migrants are put under pressure to leave the host country. Government policy does not tackle the root causes.

Research gaps include religious and cultural practices, extent of forced displacement, ethical and humanitarian issues.

Angola - Mr Sergio Carciotto, Director Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa (South Africa)

During the conflict (between 1975 and 2000) one million people were killed and four million displaced. There is now rapid economic growth – 4% per year – along with high rates of urbanisation and population growth. Increased mobility is favoured by economic development. However, challenges remain including poverty, infrastructure, water, electricity access and housing, and access to education and health care. There is a need to reduce the gaps between the different segments of society.

Migration is an ongoing debate and the government has recognised the need for policies. Thirty per cent of migrants are currently in Portugal (due to language) and 5% in South Africa (due to geographical proximity).

Two key aspects are remittances and the diaspora. The data are underestimated as migrants often use informal channels to send back remittances. The cost of sending remittances can be as high as 20%. Angola is also becoming a remittance-sending country. It is one of the top destinations for Portuguese migrants. Twenty four per cent of remittances represent the monthly income for families – these are spent on consumption not investment.

There is a brain drain – particularly from the medical sector, which means the country has to recruit expensive expatriates. There is also no comprehensive migration policy framework for irregular migrants. Illegal immigrants constitute a 'silent invasion'.

There is also some misrepresentation of migrants – they are often criminalised, and seen as a threat to national security and national identity. The Angolan government has a strategy of securing its borders. There is therefore an inherent conflict between the need for migration and development versus the securitisation of borders.

Voluntary repatriation programmes have facilitated the return of refugees, however, returnees often face problems including— lack of social services, language, acquiring documents and validating educational qualifications. Steps have been taken toward reducing human trafficking and the protection of human rights.

Challenges include – the lack of reliable data and the lack of policies or comprehensive strategies. There is no assessment of the impact of migrants on the economy, and no understanding of the impact on the country of asylum.

South Africa- Dr Sarah Pugh, University of Stellenbosch (South Africa)

South Africa has received far more attention than other countries. There are some key paradoxes and challenges – for example, while the economic logic of liberalism is one of openness the political one is closure. There are powerful incentives for the movement of goods but not for people and labour.

The history of South Africa is one of migration – both internal and external. Democracy has added new layers and new refugee legislation. The changing dynamics have produced challenges. Mistrust and resentment is rife – migrants are often positioned as carriers of disease and criminals. There are extremely negative popular social constructions.

Politicians are responsible for the protection of national interests. Migration cuts across the formal boundaries of a state. Therefore the government must navigate domestic pressures to keep migrants out versus strong economic push and pull factors. Strict bureaucratic categories don't capture the complexity of the experience.

The lack of access to basic resources of citizens also clashes with the needs of migrants. Democratisation has revealed tensions of who is entitled to the benefits of citizenship – who belongs and who does not. Migrants are often an easy target for frustrations generally against a lack of benefits.

The migration and development nexus is a difficult one – there is a potential of migration to contribute to development. Internationally remittances are now triple international donor amounts. However, migrants often remain criminalised. In May 2008 in South Africa this inherent tension erupted into violence which continues. There is also now a growing emphasis on securitisation by the government.

Discussion - Questions and Answers

How has the ECOWAS regional integration protocol been implemented and what are the challenges?

ECOWAS is an economic community. The first statement is usually free trade. There should be free movement of labour and capital – but this isn't a wall that has been crossed. Countries have repatriated ECOWAS citizens and closed borders. Many are not implementing the protocols. There are no structures to manage migration. We also haven't educated citizens on ECOWAS. ECOWAS does not have good examples to show us a case for regional migration

What is the effect on migration of the rise of religious movements in Nigeria?

Some of these groups use violence and religion as political tools. Boko Haram wants independence for part of the country. A regional effort is needed to tackle it. Nigeria must lead by example, however, the political dispensation is weak and disorganised.

How does the lack of census data accuracy in Nigeria impact on policies and decisions?

Data are not available or updated. The population census data are often outdated. There is a need to build a good database.

Migration is complex with economic and social impacts. Regarding the issue of implementing policy and legislation frameworks. What do you suggest as a solution? Standard tools and frameworks?

There is a gap between legislation and implementation. Many of these countries are one step behind. We need to look generally at how policies are formulated in African countries. There is a need to help governments understand the potential benefits of migration and the link with development. International organisations tend to cater for specific groups of migrants. If you aren't in these categories you fall behind. There is a need to look into how policies are formulated in Africa and we hope that this will happen through networks from next year.

The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) in South Africa has major capacity issues. It is seen as the department of last resort for public servants and there is a high staff turnover. Better capacity,

resourcing and training would help. Alternative institutional arrangements should also be considered. There is definitely room for improvement on oversight.

Much of the attention is on economic integration – not social and cultural. That is the reason migration is difficult. Only a few countries in Africa have traditionally received immigrants – other countries don't have the capacity to host migrants. There is a need to tackle the root causes of migration.

The diaspora is limited in participating in Nigerian politics. Decision makers have a lot of influence. In Nigeria there is a movement to promote a dual citizenship law. However, they want to engage migrants but not allow them to participate fully. Ghana passed a law in 2005 to allow migrants to vote; this hasn't been implemented.

Regarding the expectation that remittances would be used for investment. This presupposes that consumption is negative?

Remittances are seen as a panacea. Shouldn't we focus on migration? People generally migrate because they have failed and governments should do everything they can to minimise migration. There is tension between economic engagement and political disengagement?

We are not taking a stance in favour of or against remittances -just showing the different views. Does migration bring development or does development bring migration? This is not clear. Remittances can have a positive effect on families.

There are definitely ways to make remittances easier. We need to lower the transaction costs. Remittances shouldn't be used by states to replace their own development commitments. Many South African emigrants seem to cut ties rather than send remittances.

The gap between legislation and implementation is often deliberate and expedient. Is there a way to avoid this?

Different branches of the state pull indifferent directions. We need a big change in attitudes.

Panel #2 Migration and Development

Moderator: Leonir Chiarello, Scalabrini International Migration Network (United States of America)

Summary of presentations

Migration and development in Latin America: the emergence of a southern perspective—Prof Raul Delgado Wise, University of Zacatecas (Mexico)

Migration and development is not a neutral field of study. We need to reframe the dominant debate.

There is a long history of migration and development theories in Latin America which started after the Second World War. Latin America is the most urbanised region in the world. In the Neoliberal period there is an emphasis on international migration, not internal.

There are three views – the Northern perspective, the Transnational and the Southern Perspective. The Southern perspective doesn't mean a negation of the north – but rather builds an integral, inclusive perspective.

We need to contextualise the analysis, understand the international division of labour and dynamics of unequal exchange/development, forced migration (labour) and a socially committed framework and agenda. Where there is unequal exchange between developed and undeveloped countries migration is not an option, it is more a necessity.

We need to look at the impacts on origin and destination countries, the impacts on migrants and their families, and, understand the root causes of migration.

Northern and Central America and the Caribbean have free-trade agreements with the US. In South America it is very different. There is integration in South American countries. They also have alternative development projects.

The highly skilled migration and the restructuring of innovation systems causes a growing selectivity of migratory flows. Innovation is becoming more internationalised. Labour matching is being reflected in corporate-driven public policies and temporary worker programmes. This is the strategy of the large multinationals - brain circulation and brain gain. There is a need to view this from a different lens – restricting of innovation systems under the aegis of neoliberalism. In the US, 75% of patents are by foreign scientists – many from the South. However, 93% of these are owned by multinational corporations. This represents a new modality of dependency. We need to look at developing alternative development strategies. Mexico has 1.4 million professionals abroad – and is looking to build an open innovation system. We need indicators that reflect reality and demystify most common conceptions regarding migration. In the US 58% of labour are immigrants and 33% of GDP growth of the US economy was due to the contribution of immigrants between 2000 and 2010.

We also need to understand the real costs of remittances. Remittances actually represent money going from South to North, not the other way round.

Migration governance should be based on human security, which puts human rights at the centre and attempts to defend a proactive attitude. We need to tackle the root causes and not the consequences, and encourage free circulation and decent work for everyone.

Harnessing the potential of Ghanaian migrants- Dr Delali Badasu, University of Ghana (Ghana)

Remittances are seen as the development aspect of migration. A low percentage of the world's population are international migrants and therefore they receive little attention in development planning and practice. In the post-Millennium Development Goals era we hope this will get more consideration. Remittances have remained as a fairly constant percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, whether migrants are contributing or not contributing, their rights need to be respected.

Migrants have an atypical lifestyle – they often face economic risks and have no social capital. They move away from the social protection systems in their country of origin. Offering social protection to migrants improves their productivity in both the origin and destination countries. Social protection reduces risk. Trust is the most important thing.

Remittances are becoming major sources of tax revenue for governments. Eighty four per cent of West African migrants move to another country in the sub-region while 7.5 million people are involved in intra-regional migration. Many of these countries don't have social protection for their own citizens. There are huge costs involved in sending remittances — ranging from \$12 to \$32 per \$200. Migrants therefore use informal means.

Traditional sources of social capital have been undermined by socio-cultural transformations in Africa. Migrants may lose their networks over time and may establish informal social protection – e.g. church, cultural groups, in the destination country.

Due to the lack of data, policies are not based on information, and we need to understand the informal sources of social protection. The reciprocity and trust embedded in migrants' social networks should not be underestimated. Trust in government must be established to successfully implement policies.

Governance - Dr Lothar Smith, Radboud University Nijmegen (Netherlands)

Migration and development always moves towards the needs of the state. There are many ways of creating sustainable development through migration.

Three case studies give us ideas that move beyond our static notions.

Transcode Programme?—This has been going for five years, involves different actors, tries to be holistic, and not make assumptions. Many initiatives still focus on the relationship between the country of origin and destination — but do all migrants want to return home? The government approach is still territoriality which is not a good starting point.

Dutch project – wanted a stronger say in development initiatives. Organised a debate series. Important to speak about trade and development needs. The ideology is one of helping by providing aid and influencing debate in destination the country. There is a possibility to understand how people think about migration.

Centre for Migration Studies – Global South and North with perceived differences in interests. Not only governments but other actors are involved. The debate has been dominated by scholars from the North versus the South. We need to change the nature of the debate and the politics behind it. Migration is seen from the outset as problematic. We should understand how freedom of movement comes about and how forced migration takes place. We don't want to go towards the criminalisation of migration.

Summary – the assumption of lateral ties when states formulate policies shouldn't be accepted. It is an uncomfortable link. Cases show that you cannot ignore the role of the state – but it is only one of many actors. Dialogue is crucial. Not bilateral or multilateral but some other lateral. Governance is more focused on the state's interests and the state is not *the* actor but one of the actors.

Discussion - Questions and Answers

Given that there is strong consensus that remittances are pro development in low income and developing countries and we know many are transferred through non formal money transfer systems. How do we formalise these networks without having high transaction costs?

There are some efforts to reduce these costs across the world. If governments knew the mode of informal transfer is cheaper they would make people pay tax — even if only a small amount, it's guaranteed income. There is no evidence that informal is bad, it just has to be secured.

What about invisible individuals (non-legal migrants) – what can be done to promote their inclusion?

Irregular migration is often a state policy of the destination countries. They need foreign workers. They therefore create an irregular population trying to reduce their social security costs. Fifty three

per cent of the working class is under temporary working conditions – so social security is less available anyway to the working class.

Often the invisible were invisible in their own country. They remain vulnerable in migration situations. We need to understand the contribution people actually make – it may not appear in public.

We need more than one system – it has to be beneficial. What is not often considered is that when a migrant returns there is a brain loss in the destination country.

Do we have evidence of people registering for social protection from outside Ghana? People may not register due to low education (insurance is seen as giving money away or health insurance as making you sick).

Refer to the PHD research conducted by Kotoh which looks at the factors that affect the registration status of people.

Social protection has been a blind spot. Most migrants tend to be irregular, unskilled and involved in short-term jobs — is it possible to provide social protection in practice? Even for professionals doesn't the short-term nature make it problematic? Can benefits be transferred to the country of origin?

In the labour market anyone who is temporary has to be paid more due to the lack of health insurance etc. It's not just the cost of the work but benefits, leave, etc. If government's institute proper minimum wages for temporary workers this would help. If you could pay social security in your country while outside it would be good but it will take forever for governments to do this. Countries need to address their own problems.

How does migration governance intersect with US government and Mexican immigrants?

It's about the hypocrisy of the US government – they have appealed to the mass media image of migrants as public enemies. This is not reality but popular discourse. We need to disseminate a different version. Mexico is the gatekeeper for migrants from Central America into the US.

Panel #3 Focus Country: Irregular Migration

Moderator: Dr Rene Manenti, Center for Migration Studies (Rome)

Summary of presentations

Irregular migration - Dr Fabio Baggio, Scalabrini International Migration Institute

This involves the movement of people outside of the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries. It must be seen from the perspectives of both the receiving and sending countries. Borders are a human invention and recent in human history. Defending borders is the last symbol of state sovereignty. Since 2011, borders have become increasingly connected with security issues. Both in Europe and the US there is increasingly restrictive immigration which has led to an increase in irregular migrants. It's also become difficult to distinguish between asylum seekers and migrants (mixed flows).

There are many different aspects to irregular migration. In the former Society Union countries there are many new borders – people have found themselves irregular. "We did not cross the border the border crossed us." In Africa there was imposition of artificial borders by Colonial powers. In Latin and Central America – there is an increase in African and Asian migration due to US restrictions. When the

EU admitted new countries, millions of irregular migrants became regular. In the Pacific Islands – the 'Pacific solution' was implemented and camps were created for irregular migrants.

This opens the debate on the ethical or non-ethical foundations of its definition and the 'right to migrate'. Irregular migration is a consequence of the implementation of immigration policies.

The causes of irregular migration include – unequal development, lack of labour and livelihood opportunities, threats to personal security, limitations of the numbers of legal immigrants, inconsistency between regulations and needs of local economies, high costs and waiting times of regular channels, restrictive rules regarding families, the migration industry, free visa entry with no right to stay, demand for cheap labour especially by people of the same nationality, strong ethnic and social networks, and misleading advocacy.

We have to ask who gains from irregular migration. It's mostly smugglers and traffickers, the sending country governments, corrupt officials, employers, private households (that employ domestic workers), consumers (who can buy cheap goods), and the sex industry.

Who losses –the victims, the irregular migrants, and the host country fiscal system.

The perception is usually that irregular migrants are criminals or victims.

The EU devotes lots of resources to fight irregular migration but nothing to help migrants' social integration.

Priorities include – promoting the right not to migrate, eradicating the culture of migration with awareness raising, combatting the improper use of entry requirements, introducing regular migration schemes, applying stronger sanction to employers, promoting dialogue between centres, and, promoting all governance levels to enhance human dignity.

Irregular migration in Kenya - Dr Linda Oucho, African Migration and Development Policy Centre (Kenya)

Undocumented migrants don't like being called 'illegal' because it sounds like they are criminals. Their movement is often a response to events taking place in neighbouring countries. They are hoping to access resources and meet needs not available in their own country. They therefore use clandestine methods including smuggling. Irregular migrants come to Kenya from South Sudan, the DRC, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, East African Community, and Non-African nationals (including from Pakistani and Indian). Some come due to conflict, others due to poverty, climate change, their nomadic (pastoralist) history (there have been moves to document these pastoralists but it hasn't happened yet).

The border officials have a lack of training and don't know how to implement the laws. There are 30 illegal entry points — making it impossible to control. Even at some of the legal border posts they receive up to 600 migrants per day. Corruption is still apparent but not as much as before. Nothing in the policies refers to irregular migrants. Very few officials interviewed had a position on the matter. The government is currently developing a policy but so far only government officials are being consulted. There are a lack of guidelines on irregular migration and no detailed information about access routes. It is a low priority to government and they lack the resources to manage it. When the law is enforced there is evidence of human rights abuses. The Operation Usaalma Watch was introduced in response to insecurity in the country — but it was very badly managed, showing inhuman treatment. Irregular migrants have been linked to xenophobia. It is unclear whether police can apply the laws.

There is a need to do research to get an idea of problem, however, it is high-risk research and there is a fear of repercussions. There is a need to review what policies are needed. There is also a need to train the media in how they report on migrants.

Expanding illegality - The limits of South Africa's migration management regime - Dr Roni Amit, University of the Witwatersrand (South Africa)

The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) in South Africa has adopted a very expanded assumption of illegality. The DHA often acts outside of the legal framework under the guise of security. Migration has been framed as a security issue.

When we use the term 'irregular migrants' we are talking mostly about lesser-skilled migrants but the policies also affect skilled migrants. There was emergence of policy that was in contrast to the legal framework after democracy. There is also a large degree of autocratic autonomy by the DHA as well as general hostility of people and government towards migration. The weakening of the judiciary and dominance of the ANC Executive Committee has also not improved the situation. The conditions at Lindela (the transit camp for deportees), which have been known to be problematic for years, were investigated by a government appointed committee which concluded that the conditions were not so bad and called for even tougher measures.

There is increased securitisation and reframing of migration as a security issue. As far back as 1997, the DHA identified migrants as "disease carrying" and "threatening welfare and resources". There are claims that most are economic migrants and the notion of migrants flooding the country is widely promulgated. There is no recognition of the humanitarian and development aspects of migration. There is also increased reliance on detention and deportation, and very few options to escape deportation once you are detained (it becomes a legal black hole). There is a presumption of illegality once a person is sent to Lindela. Even though detention practices have been declared illegal in court cases, they persist. People have lost the protection of the Refugees Act. Asylum seekers are automatically seen as illegal immigrants. The changes in the Immigration Act enacted this year makes it harder to employ foreigners.

There are important myths that need to be debunked –

- SA is being overwhelmed by migrants. Actually they are only 3.3% of population according to the 2011 Census.
- SA is shouldering a higher burden than the rest of Africa. This is not true; it is lower than many countries. SA is also not spending any resources on migrants.
- There is no empirical basis for the link between foreigners and crime.
- Increased border security does not have a deterrent effect, it only fosters crime. We are therefore spending money on failed policies.
- The Immigration Act is not too permissive. It is hard to seek legal entry.
- Migrants are a net economic drain. This is not true many are self-sufficient and contribute to the economy.
- Only 50% have economic motives as opposed to the belief that it is 95%.

Securitisation management actually increases the number of undocumented migrants. Undocumented workers in labour pushes down wages, tax, and opportunities to invest.

Migrants are targeted for criminality. They are more vulnerable to corruption. This diverts resources from real crime fighting, and creates opportunities for criminality at border posts.

The policy is largely reactive, with no specific goals other than exclusion. It is not evidenced based, it is outside of the legal framework, removed from the daily reality of migrants, motivated by keeping people out, and, not achieving the country's goals.

Discussion - Questions and Answers

South Africa was in a catch 22 situation. The country didn't anticipate the pull from rest of world once the borders were opened. There was no legislation in place. What should South Africa have done given the pressure and lack of legislation?

The problem is not necessarily the legislation. It is the way it is moving now and the fact that we are not adopting evidence-based solutions. We won't stop people coming in, so need to manage the situation properly and humanly. We need to decide on the outcome we want and the best way to get there.

Is the economic myth due to the way the applicant presents themselves to border officials? What other factors are there?

The status information process at borders is a complete sham. The answers don't make sense. Most people have mixed migration motives.

Are there are any similar agreements regarding pastoralists in Kenya other than the original British legislation?

There is nothing in place right now. It is currently in discussion but nothing concrete is in place. Part of the problem is changing governments - new governments may take on board the existing strategy or introduce new ones.

Clearly migrants contribute but they out compete, especially in informal trading sector and are displacing locals by doing it better (which is seen as unfair economic competition). How migration affects you depends on what you do for a living.

We have to ask what constitutes unfair economic competition. The Somalis in South Africa are not pooling resources for economic advantage as is often portrayed. There is evidence that they are doing things South African traders could do, they just don't want to (like having longer opening hours). Should the country continue to engage in non-competitive practices? South African traders may find themselves at a disadvantage but the community is getting more affordable things at better hours – so there is an economic benefit for them.

There is a problem in linking all foreigners – can one policy be applied to all? It's easier for some nationalities to get papers than others. How do you address all of this in your policies?

Papers should never be more important than the person. Migrants are people trying to find a better future – we have to think how those chances can be given.

Migrants are sometimes instructed to present themselves as asylum seekers to get in. This undermines the process for those who are actually escaping. We have to enhance the concept of refugees and asylum seekers.

In Kenya, in general, it is not a challenge for a refugee to seek asylum. There are no challenges in getting papers. The Department of Refugee Affairs allows refugees to apply for work permits or obtain training.

In the US (specifically Arizona) a sector that benefits is the prison sector which is privatised. How do you manage the fact that entities (like prisons and transport services) benefit from deportation?

There are definitely industries whose wealth is increased by the process. For example, Lindela is run by a private contractor – how much they are paid is not made public. The price of freedom increases with each step in the detention process.

Panel #4 Focus Country: Re-integration of Returnees

Moderator: Tobias Kessler, Centre for Migration Research (Switzerland)

Summary of presentations

Return migration policies and programmes in the Philippines – a work in progress - Dr Maruja Asis, Scalabrini Migration Centre (Philippines)

There has been large-scale and persistent migration since the 1970s in the Philippines – about 10% of the population is abroad. Africa has the smallest number of Filipino migrants. The international labour migration programme started in 1974. By 2013 there were 1.8 million migrants. It is a very important source country for seafarers. The Philippines is the third-largest recipient of remittances. Return migration is expected and structured. Migration is temporary - usually two-year work contracts. There is a tendency for workers to renew their contracts or re-migrate. When migration ends has become a major discussion point. Often retirement signals the end of migration. A large proportion come back temporarily. Return migration is not as well researched - there are data gaps. The scale and magnitude is not known and there is also no real idea of the profiles of returnees. It is estimated that 3.5 to 4.5 million have returned since 1974. Economic constraints are the major concerns of returnees. Economic re-integration is most important. They have very little knowledge about the re-integration programmes offered by the government. There seems to be renewed interest in return migration. It has always posed a challenge in policies. The underlying assumption is that it is the end of temporary migration. Re-integration programmes are a work in progress. The National Re-integration Centre was established to address re-integration issues -to develop support programmes, financial programmes, and also assist with job opportunities and capacity building. There is a growing appreciation that one size doesn't fit all. Those returning from conflict regions have different needs, for example. Recent experiences include people returning from conflict zones like Syria. Specific mechanisms have been developed for these returnees.

There is a very good national framework but the connection with the local government framework is not good. They are starting to involve the co-operation of the destination country. It takes a village to realise the development potentials of return migration.

There are a lack of data and success stories. The international exchange of experiences is also very important.

Refugees, re-integration and internal mobility – looking at Angola's case 2003 – 2013 - Dr Carlos Lopes, University Agostinho Neto (Angola)

There is scarce information available. After the war there was economic growth. There was good performance of the oil sector and an effective strategy of economic stabilisation. So there is good socio-economic growth but challenges remain –Angola is currently 148thonthehuman development index. The distribution of wealth is unequal. Angola also imports almost everything which means the cost of living is high. During the war there was much internal migration. The patterns of migratory flow are similar to other African countries with migrants looking for business opportunities, jobs and education. There is also forced internal migration in the direction of the main urban centres. Natural disasters have also caused internal displacement. There are some skilled immigrants and some returnees. There is also an increase in the number of irregular migrants. Ex-soldiers are also internal migrants. Unplanned urban development, difficulties in accessing services and protection are all challenges.

Former refugees have returned in different phases. Some choose to remain in the countries of asylum. From 2002 to 2013 more than 500 000 refugees returned according to official figures. The repatriation process is, however, not finished yet. Significant numbers indicate their socio-economic situation has improved, but some say they feel marginalised. Many move again once back in the country to areas of more economic opportunity.

Further studies are needed on the appropriate and effective policies required. Programmes are in place but not completely implemented.

Discussion - Questions and Answers

This is a crucial and complex topic, and a new field of study. In Mexico it is forced via deportation. Many migrants return in bad shape. In Angola there is economic boom which is attracting people and fostering return migration. Can migration be a driver for development?

The Philippines also deals with deportation from Malaysia. The government can only give emergency type assistance. Many ask "what now" once they are safe. The default need is to find work.

Society in Angola is divided – some are favourable to migration and see it as helping development, others see it as people replacing them. Facilitating migration would help the economy in Angola.

Can you elaborate on the Korean return programme? What is the fundamental difference that explain things from an economic perspective?

There was a lot at stake for the Korean government to ensure that people didn't stay in Korea. Migrant workers recruited by Korea are the least interested due to the forced return programme.

Are there any cultural or family related behaviours with respect to migrants? Has behaviour changed over time? What is your experience?

Most migration in the Philippines is voluntary — relatively. There could be pressure from family members to work abroad. There is no stigma attached to wanting to work abroad. Returning is not a problem. The only difficult family dynamics appear to be in the case of those who have been trafficked — they fear that they will be seen as failures and not accepted. Those repatriated from crisis situations also face some challenges but families try very hard to adjust to the situation.

Angolan refugees in SA – what is the experience of Angolans who returned from secession? Is there any research on this?

There is a gap in the research – no studies have been conducted. The secession clause happened in South Africa quite recently hence the gap. Scalabrini is looking at it as a possible area of research.

Concluding remarks

Prof Simon Bekker, Sociology and Social Anthropology Department, University of Stellenbosch

The presentations at this conference have been both diverse and rich in detail so I am only able, during these closing comments, to offer you two modest thoughts.

• The first is to locate a number of the arguments we have heard at different geographic levels or scales: from the global to the continental and subsequently, to the regional and nation-state and to the citizen and finally to members of the rank-and-file, to the "people".

• The second thought is to point to what I consider to be a major paradox about cross-border migration on the African continent that has emerged from our discussions today.

<u>I:</u>

At the global scale, we heard not only of the distinction between the North and the global South but also of the need and the attempt to develop a way of looking at migration from the perspective of the global South – a challenging and important call to develop an original approach rather than importing one from the North.

At the continental scale, we were offered by a number of speakers, implicitly at least, a comparison of the migration systems in Africa and in South America. A lot can be learnt from such comparisons, both in terms of similarities and differences. As an example, both these continents experience rapid urbanization: driven importantly in South America by industrialization which is not the case in contemporary Africa.

At the scales of regional organizations - such as SADEC and ECOWAS – as well as nation-states in Africa, many speakers agreed that important gaps existed between policy and practice (praxis). There are two explanations for such gaps (which are not necessarily mutually exclusive): the first is that policy-makers use rhetoric to convince politicians and voters of their goodwill but do not translate this rhetoric into practice; the second is that though the intention is to translate words into deeds, there is simply an absence of capacity, both human and material. Which explanation is the more important in different bodies at different times is important to pin down.

At the level of citizenship, it became clear that nation-states tend to privilege their citizens above others that reside in the country. This focus is clearly important but it is equally important, to my mind, to point out that there are within these nation-states important internal migration flows that are in many ways similar to cross-border flows.

Fifthly, we heard from a number of speakers the voices – the reported experiences - of cross-border migrants. Beyond institutions and organizations, these speakers emphasize that "voice" is fundamental to complement structural explanations of migration streams and their challenges. And giving "voice" to actors may enable giving agency to them as well.

<u>II:</u>

I finish by defining for you a major migration paradox on the African continent that has emerged from the presentations today.

We know that most if not all nation-states on the African continent today comprise elites, the privileged, on the one hand, and the rank-and-file, the under-privileged, on the other. In most cases, the first grouping is particularly small, the second particularly large; in a few, the elite are a larger minority, the rank-and-file a smaller majority. This characterization which has been named Afropessimism remains true today but needs to be complemented by the observation that a number of African nation-states are experiencing rapid economic growth and a concomitant growth in their middle classes. This has been named "Africa ascendant".

What has struck me during our conference is that the nation-states most discussed by us were precisely those few that are ascendant: Ghana, Kenya, Angola, Nigeria and South Africa. In these countries, as the small middle class expands, the under-privileged citizens who are more than aware of this expansion, aspire to, sometimes demand, a better life for themselves as well. Simultaneously, citizens in other often neighbouring countries that do not share this economic growth, look to, and

often migrate to, these better-off countries (where they are prepared to work longer hours, accepted lesser remuneration, than the citizens of these countries). Both voluntary as well as forced migrants find themselves competing with locals.

Hence the paradox: The citizens believe that they are entitled to share in the economic growth of their country, the foreign migrants believe they have a better chance for improving their and their families' life changes and living conditions in a neighbouring foreign country and it is the political economy (rather than simply the economy or the political system) of these nation-states that produce tension and potential conflict between these two groupings. This clash of interests requires careful consideration and judicious intervention.

END